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SERBIAN JERUSALEM:
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND THE
INVENTION OF A HOLY LAND IN EUROPE’S PERIPHERY, 1985-2017
By Vjekoslav Perica
Vjekoslav Perica is the author of Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav
States and a number of other scholarly publications. His most recent book, Pax Americana in the
Adriatic and the Balkans, 1919-2014, was published in 2015 in Zagreb, Croatia. Perica obtained
a PhD in history from the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, served as a U.S. Fulbright
scholar in Serbia and held research fellowships at the United States Institute of Peace, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in
Humanities and Social Sciences, and Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human
Rights. He has taught at several U.S. and European universities. Since 2006, Perica has held a
professorship at the University of Rijeka in Croatia. Perica lives with his wife in Baltimore,
Maryland, where he is currently working on a book and occasionally lectures on Europe.
ABSTRACT
According to beliefs of religious nationalism, a nation is a community of ancestors and
descendants, dead and living, past and present. As such, it incorporates within its territory all
past and present markers of nationhood, notably historic religious monuments as the physical
evidence of the perennial existence of the religious and ethnic community that is, in the
nationalist imagination, of the nation. Thus, the history of the shrines and monuments, as told in
religious tales and preserved in the rituals, is the history of the nation. In many parts of the
world, contesting claims to consecrated territories clash. The struggles evolve into holy wars
between good and evil and angels and demons. The enmity cemented by religion does not end
until demythologization of history or until one side or the other has been destroyed. At the same
time, in a globalized world, narratives of ethnic and religious nationalisms are no longer isolated
from each other as they used to be. In recent decades, they have observed each other and
borrowed and influenced one another. The case under consideration comparatively observes the
conflicts in Kosovo in the Balkan and in Israel-Palestine in order to critically examine the
nationalist and religious politics behind the nationalist discourses on history and religion, the past
and the present, and the sacred and the secular.
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1.

Introduction
Since the national self-determination debates at the Paris Peace conference a hundred

years ago, the Balkans and the Middle East have become presumably the most instructive
laboratories for students of nationalist struggles and unfinished nation-formation. A hundred
years ago, two men of the hour, American President Wilson and Russian communist leader
Lenin, proclaimed the “right” to national self-determination although no world leader to this day
has elaborated who, when, and how to achieve it peacefully.1 Since then, various nationalist
movements have become involved in territorial disputes often inciting regional wars.2 Wilson
insisted on democratic legitimation for nationalist claims through plebiscites verified by the
international community that would show the will of the majority population in often-contested
territories. Well in advance of the Paris Peace conference, various nationalist movements, all of
them referring to Wilson’s points and principles, had become involved in territorial disputes
threatening regional wars. Seeking stability and making the new world order, the peacemakers at
Paris deployed multinational peacekeeping forces in areas of nationalist conflict to buy time to
study maps and books in history and anthropology to adjudicate contesting claims.3 Nationalist
movements in conflict, particularly in imperial and colonial domains or within ethnically
heterogeneous states with separatist-minded groups, have typically justified their claims to
territory and sovereignty, either by an ethnic majority principle or by “historical rights” invoking
earlier forms of autonomy, statehood, or cultural influence, or by various combinations of these
principles.

Joseph S. Nye, “The Who, Where, and When of Secession”, 29. 09. 2017 at PS online, https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/self-determination-problems-catalonia-kurdistan-by-joseph-s--nye-2017-09.
2
See Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial
Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
3
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, (New York: Random House, 2002).
1
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Managing the early post-World War I national self-determination claims and territorial
disputes, Woodrow Wilson hoped to help the implementation of the majority principle if asserted
through plebiscites and democratic elections showing the “consent of the governed” regarding
the government under which they chose to live. In an international controversy that the U.S.
press followed on front pages after the Great War, Wilson alienated hundreds of thousands of
Democratic Party’s voters of Italian ancestry by rejecting Italy’s claims on the East Adriatic
based on the historical rights.4 Italy first attempted territorial gains based on secret wartime
treaties with the Allies, which Wilson had earlier condemned. Then, Italian representatives at the
peace conference argued (correctly) that the tiny Italian urban communities with an evident
tradition, archeology, and Latin influence dominate Dalmatian cities culturally over the Slavic
majority population. Wilson nevertheless supported the Slavic majority’s claims and even sent in
battleships to prevent Italian annexation of the disputed territory.5 Wilson saw the South Slavs as
a potential and promising nation developing with western assistance and defending the West
against communist Russia. He disregarded the particular ethnicities within the Slavic ethnic core,
which continued demanding their own particular rights to national self-determination.6
At the same time in Palestine, Britain and America did not back the Arab majority against
the Jewish minority. On the contrary, the two world powers supported the Jewish minority with
historic rights seeking to restore ancient statehood and claiming the territory marked by
narratives, memories, and historic landmarks from the period of that ancient statehood and by
memories of the long persecution of stateless Jews longing for the “sacred act of return” to their
original homeland. Both Arab and Zionist representatives were invited to present their cases
“Dalmatian Coast Likely to be Slav; But Fiume May go to Italy in Settlement of Adriatic Problem – America is the
Umpire,” New York Times, 02.02.1919; see Vjekoslav Perica, Pax Americana in the Adriatic and the Balkans, 19192014 (In Croatian), (Zagreb: Algoritam, Mostar: Algoritam Stanek, 2015), p.35.
5
See the details in Perica, Pax Americana, pp. 33-117.
6
Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, pp. 7 and 59.
4
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before the Paris Peace conference. Evidently, the idea of a “Jewish national homeland in
Palestine” received support not only from Britain but also from Wilson and the United States.7
The Zionist movement could not win a plebiscite in Palestine so that the world powers allowed a
precedent by recognizing the minority’s claims based on history, religion, and persecution while
actually denying the right to national self-determination to the majority population.8 However, it
seems improbable that either Wilson or Lenin anticipated a future for conservative and religious
variants of nationalism. Although the former was religious and the latter atheist, both shared
modernist and secularist understanding of nationhood. The two did not imagine nation as a
perennial, mystical, and timeless sacred community of ancestors and descendants with a state
that should incorporate all places of memory, former and present territories—as the dominant
type of nationalism would a hundred years later.
Ever since then, the case of Palestine has exemplified a territorial conflict between the
historic versus the majority rights and other disputes emphasizing history, memory, religion, and
suffering. Eight decades later, a Serbian nationalist movement would argue that the Serbs are the
Jews of the Balkans. An ethnic Serb minority of the Kosovo region, in conflict with majority
ethnic Albanians, would claim the territory and statehood based on historic rights as evident
from memories, religious rituals, narratives and monuments about Serb ancient kingdom in the
disputed area. To make the Serb case even more similar to the Jewish, the Serb movement would
also emphasize self-sacrifice and persecution of Serbs ever since the fourteenth century Ottoman
conquest of the Balkans and particularly in the Second World War.
At any rate, since the peacemaking and boundary-drawing at the Paris Peace conference,
the international conflict management had to deal with nationalist movements arguing over the
7

Ibid., p. 59.
“Balfour Declaration Centenary: Read The Historic Letter Pledging British Support For The Creation Of Israel,”
The Independent, 29. 10. 2017.
8
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evidence of “who got there first,” who suffered more, and how state boundaries should be
(re)drawn to carefully consider historic and sacred sites. Some recent studies found the cases of
the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and the Balkans comparable and instructive particularly when
observed in a wider global-comparative perspective.9
The conflicts of this kind, sometimes described as ethnic, religious, historical, or
perennial, seem ancient although they are of recent origins. Even the crucial influence of religion
is new. A hundred years ago, the world of Wilson and Lenin was probably religious as it always
had been, yet religion was arguably less influential in international relations and public affairs.
Yet, since the concluding decades of the twentieth century, religion has evidently influenced the
remaking of the world order and the idea of the secular state.10 The secular ideologies that
Wilson and Lenin represent have lost much of their appeal, while religion, culture and identity
shape policies and strategies of state building and national development.11 The shift has
occurred, as Samuel P. Huntington has suggested, at the end of the twentieth century in a desecularized, post-ideological, and globalizing world with religious violence among the emblems
of the new era.12

9

Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007); Beáta Huszka, Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict: Debate-Framing and
Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns. (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).
10
Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. (Washington,
D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1999); Thomas M. Scott.
The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of
the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005); Mark Juergensmeyer. The New Cold War? :
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993; Craig Calhoun,
Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. Rethinking Secularism. (Oxford, N.Y. : Oxford University
Press, 2011).
11
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: the New Global Politics of Religion. (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015); Anna Grzymala-Busse, Nations Under God. How Churches use Moral
Authority to Influence Policy. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015).
12
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. hardcover ed., (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2011); Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from
Christian Militias to al Qaeda. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
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2. 1.

Importing Serbian Jerusalem in World Affairs

The restructuring of nations in southeastern Europe is an unfinished process that has
begun in the two last decades of the twentieth century. The destruction of the Yugoslav
federation was not an incident but a longer process initiated by a massive nationalist movement
that originated in the largest Yugoslav federal republic of Serbia that spread to Kosovo, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere in the region. The Serb movement began by
disputing autonomy of the Kosovo province in which ethnic Albanians, mostly Muslims, sought
greater autonomy. The minority Christian Serbs opposed it, describing the Albanians as
successors of the Ottoman oppressors. Kosovo Albanians, according to the allegations publicized
in the 1980s, planned to expel Serbs and destroy their historic monuments, churches,
monasteries, and historic sites commemorating a Serb medieval kingdom and the 1389 battle
against the invading Ottoman Turks at the Kosovo field, both crucial for Serb national identity.
The Serbian Orthodox Church was the first Serb institution that dared, as early as the 1960s, to
publicize that Kosovo Albanians allegedly persecuted the Church and expelled the local Kosovo
Serbs.13 The Kosovo dispute of the 1980s escalated into a wider regional conflict and several
cycles of bloody ethnic and civil wars that involved several former Yugoslav republic and ethnic
nations.14

13

See Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), pp. 43-55 and 123-165.
14
See more about the Yugoslav disintegration and the Balkan wars of the 1990s in Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel:
the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević, 4th ed., (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 2002); Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in
Bosnia and Kosovo. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Škeljzen Malići. Kosovo and the
Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije, razgovor vodio Baton Hadžiu, preveo s albanskog Anton
Berišaj). (Beograd: Links, Mostart, 2014); Erich Rathfelder. Kosovo: History of a Conflict (Kosovo: Geschichte
eines Konflikts), 1st ed., Aufl., Originalausg.(Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010).
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Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the ethnic civil wars of the 1990s, seven new
states eventually emerged in the area, including an independent Republic of Kosovo. After the
Serb-Albanian war in Kosovo and the 1999-2000 NATO intervention paved the way to Kosovo
independence, the United States established a major military base and maintained an
international coalition to stabilize the region. The militarily weakened Serbia did not surrender.
The Serbian Orthodox Church and nationalist parties intensified the propaganda about the
alleged Albanian genocide, refusing to recognize Kosovo statehood and lobbied worldwide for
recognition and defense of Serbia historic rights and Christian cultural heritage endangered by
Albanian ethnic nationalism and a growing Muslim extremism. Unable to deny an overwhelming
ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, Serbia claimed the territory on historical grounds. Kosovo
is presented as the center of large kingdom under an ethnic Serb dynasty as well as a major
regional sacred center surviving five centuries of Muslim conquest. The Church published an
encyclopedia showing the well-preserved cultural heritage including several hundred churches,
monasteries, cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohija (the first term denotes the Field of Black Birds,
that is the historic battlefield of 1389, and the second the monastery-owned land).15 Church
leaders hoped to keep the land with the monasteries within the Serbian state. Alternatively, the
Church initially considered territorial partition (followed by annexation by Serbia of the most
important monasteries) and autonomous status exempted from Albanian authority as for example
the Patriarchate of Peć used to be during some periods of Ottoman rule. Since the 2008
proclamation of Kosovo independence, Serbia’s state and church leaders have more often
referred to Kosovo as “Serbian Jerusalem” meaning “the holiest place” or “holy land,” leaving

Slobodan Mileusnić, ed., Monasteries of Serbia: Large Illustrated Encyclopedia, vols. 1-2, translation into
English Alice Copple-Tošić. (Novi Sad: Pravoslavna reč, 2002); Slobodan Mileusnić, ed. The Monasteries of
Kosovo and Metohija, 2nd ed., (Novi Sad: Pravoslavna reč, 2001).
15
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other meanings and connotations vague until Patriarch Irenej espoused the comparison between
Serbs and Jews as the most severely persecuted peoples.
In his 2017 Christmas message, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch
Irenej, stated: “We pray for the Crucified Kosovo and Metohija, the land that is our spiritual and
national cradle, the land that the great bishop-poet Njegoš named “the grand tribunal of history.”
As long as Serbs live, Kosovo lives also. Kosovo is soul of the Serb! For that reason Kosovo will
always be Serb land, because our Golgotha and our Jerusalem are there!”16 The Patriarch mainly
reiterated his 2015 Kosovo statement at a local religious festival: “For the Serbs, Kosovo is holy
land, our Jerusalem, and our Palestine. Serbs have always defended their holy places. We will
again protect our heritage in the Kosovo, by all our human resources and by all available means.
If necessary, we will shed blood to defend what is ours, what our Lord has endowed to us.”17
Since the 1980s, Serb Church leaders have only sporadically used the Jerusalem metaphor
referring to Kosovo. The Patriarch Irenej, enthroned in 2010, promoted “Serbian Jerusalem” into
a new dominant religious discourse.
Serbian political leaders, and particularly the new state diplomacy after the proclamation
of Kosovo independence, borrowed the Jerusalem metaphor from nationalist writers and Church
leaders. Aware of the disrepute of the Balkans as the infamous zone of conflict and the most
backward periphery of which Western and Central Europe have long been ashamed,18 the new
Serbian diplomacy espoused the Serbian Jerusalem metaphor as an explanatory and propaganda
tool. The objective was to make Serbia and Kosovo seem more relevant in world politics by
Patriarch Irenej’s Christmas Letter (“Dok je Srba, biće i Kosova i Metohije, ono će ostati naša zemlja),” Blic, 03.
01. 2017, at http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/bozicna-poslanica-patrijarha-irineja-dok-je-srba-bice-i-kosova-imetohije-ono-ce/385vewj.
17
“Kosovo is Serbian Jerusalem” (Kosovo je srpski Jerusalim),” Večernje novosti, Belgrade, 25. 11.;
Peščanik, http://pescanik.net, 28.11.2015.
18
See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
16
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suggesting parallels with the Middle East, Israel, and Palestine, as global issues of highest
relevance and constant mass media attention. In 2010, foreign minister Vuk Jeremić said in an
interview to the German media: “Serbia should not be forced to decide between EU membership
and Kosovo … Kosovo has deep historical and spiritual meaning for the people of Serbia. In a
certain sense, it is our Jerusalem.”19 On another occasion, in explaining the Kosovo controversy
to an American audience, Jeremić stated:
We Serbs have an unbreakable bond with Kosovo. Here’s what Patriarch Pavle, who led
our Church for almost twenty years said about Kosovo: “It is the wellspring of the
Serbian spiritual tradition, and of our statehood; the heart and soul of our nation—
indivisible and essential. That is why our forefathers consecrated its soil with thousands
of beautiful garlands: adorning the land with magnificent churches and monasteries
dedicated to the glory of God … Kosovo is our Valley Forge and Yorktown, our Alamo
and Gettysburg, our Pearl Harbor and Iwo Jima—all rolled into one. It is in our dreams
at night, and in our prayers in church. It is the ‘apple of our eye.’ It is our Jerusalem.”20
The military loss of Kosovo and the massive exodus of Kosovo Serbs to Serbia invoked
the mythical narratives and inspired the religious discourses in Serbian nationalism. The
Church’s influence grew compensating for the weakened and corrupt state in a society
devastated by wars, international sanctions, and failing post-communist transition. The Church
offered the people a new history in which Serbia had always been a righteous party, while
sacrifices and losses were only temporary and moral investment was needed for a future renewal.
Anticipating post-war negotiations and diplomatic battles for Kosovo and other disputed
territories across the Balkans, Serb leaders began explaining the historic rights to the world. For
example, Alexandar Karađorđević, the son of king Peter II ousted by Yugoslav communists,

Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić: “Kosovo 'Is Our Jerusalem',” Spiegel Online International, 31.05.2010,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/serbian-foreign-minister-vuk-jeremic-kosovo-is-our-jerusalem-a697725.html.
20
“Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Vuk Jeremić Address at the Wheaton College, ‘Identity, Reconciliation, and the
Struggle over Kosovo,’” 17.03. 2011, Embassy of the Republic of Serbia, Washington D.C.,
http://www.serbiaembusa.org/newstext.php?subaction=showfull&id=1300460897&archive=&start_from=&ucat=19
19
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during the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999, sent a letter to presidents of the USA and
France and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, emphasizing that,
“France, United Kingdom and the United States have been traditional allies of Serbia in
the West. That makes me wonder has the use of NATO air strikes against Serbia been the only
appropriate answer to the failure of diplomatic negotiations. In the two world wars, history has
shown that my people does not respond favorably to ultimatums and pressures. Moreover, it
should not be forgotten that Kosovo is a Serbian Jerusalem and a cradle of the Serbian state. The
greatest sacred monuments, part of the Serbian heritage, are located in Kosovo … Kosovo is an
inalienable part of Serbia and Serbs have the right to defend what is theirs …”21
Although it sounds appealing and seductive, the nationalist discourse about Serbian
Jerusalem, like most nationalist manipulations with the past for present purposes, is an invented
tradition. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, the invention of tradition involves “modern
nationalist practices of using ancient materials to construct invented tradition of a novel type for
quite novel purposes … the new traditions use old materials, invent new language or devices,
extend the old symbolic vocabulary beyond established limits …”22 Applied to the uses of the
past about Kosovo, Kosovo is not, to begin with, a “cradle” of the Serbian nation. Neither
medieval nor modern Serbia were founded within borders of present-day Kosovo. Modern Serbia
developed in what is today northern Serbia at a lengthy distance from Kosovo and other southern
regions. The memory and later state patriotic myth about the medieval empire and its downfall at
the 1389 Kosovo medieval battle are narratives and practices of nation building inaugurated in

“Kosovo is Our Cradle and Our Jerusalem.” (Kosovo Je naša kolevka i Srpski Jerusalim), Telegraf online, 07. 04.
1999, http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/2062632-kosovo-je-nasa-kolevka-i-srpski-jerusalim-ovo-je-kralj-srbijeporucio-klintonu-bleru-i-siraku-tokom-bombardovanja-srbije.
22
Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), pp. 6-7.
21
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the nineteenth century.23 Medieval Serbia, including both church and state, was founded in the
thirteenth century in central Serbia, outside borders of the present-day Kosovo. Kosovo
historically signifies the area of the later fourteenth-century imperial expansion of the Serbian
state and temporary seat of the Church under Ottoman rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. In short, the new Serbian nationalism since the 1980s has invented and magnified the
importance of Kosovo to the proportions of a Jerusalem and a holy land of the Serbs. The
purpose of revitalizing the medieval narrative of the lost pride and revenge was the postYugoslav and post-communist mass mobilization of Serbs for the Greater Serbia project. In other
words, as the contemporary political discourse would put it: making Serbia great again.

2.2.

From Cradle to Golden Age: Imprecise Metaphors, Invented Traditions, Myths of

Nationhood
Medieval Serbia originated in the early thirteenth century in the province of Rascia/Raška
in present-day central Serbia. Almost a century later, the earliest Serb state later expanded to
Kosovo (after the Field of Black Birds, later the Kosovo battlefield) and Metohija (denoting
monastery-owned land) in the present-day Kosovo. This part of what would be later, when
modern Serbia re-emerged at the northern capital Belgrade, called Old Serbia, is the actual
“cradle” of Serbia. Because there, not in Kosovo, the princes and bishops of the Nemanjić
dynasty established an independent kingdom and a self-governing Christian Church of the
Byzantine rite and ruled there for more than a hundred years prior to the foundation of an
imperial capital and a supreme church authority in Kosovo. The principal shrine and historic
monument where the Church independence was proclaimed is the monastery of Studenica in the
Ivan Čolović, Death at the Kosovo Field: History of the Kosovo Myth (Smrt na Kosovu polju. Istorija Kosovskog
mita). (Belgrade. Biblioteka xx vek, 2016).
23
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village Studenica, Commune of Kraljevo, Raška District, Republic of Serbia.24 Established in the
late twelfth century by Stevan Nemanja, founder of the medieval Serb state, Studenica is the
largest of Serbia’s medieval monasteries. Its two principal monuments, the Church of the Virgin
and the Church of the King, both built of white marble, enshrine priceless collections of
thirteenth and fourteenth century Byzantine paintings. UNESCO posted Studenica on World
Heritage List in 1986, two decades before any of the Kosovo monasteries. Another key sacred
historic monument from this earliest period of Serbian statehood is the monastery Žića, located
in the heartland of Serbia. Žića lies at the distance of about 300 kilometers to the west from
Priština, the present-day capital of Kosovo, and about 250 km from the Kosovo town of Peć
(Ipek), the later seat of the patriarchate. At the Žića monastery built by King Stefan of the
Nemanjić dynasty and his son Sava, in 1219, a church council proclaimed an independent
archdiocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church electing Sava as the archbishop. The Žića
monastery is the place of coronation of the first Serb ruler Stefan and six other Serb kings. There,
the first head of the Church was enthroned. In short, the earliest and oldest, historically most
important Serb monasteries are Žića, Studenica and Sopoćani. Hilandar, the most important
Serbian holy place outside Serbia, is in Greece, built atop the Holy Mountain Athos in Greece.25
The four holiest and historically most relevant churches and monasteries, and the indisputably
major saintly cult of the church’s founder and the state’s co-founder, St. Sava, are all located in
Serbia outside Kosovo. Although there are hundreds of more or less preserved Serb historic
monuments in Kosovo, only two, namely the old Patriarchate at Peć and the Dečani monastery,
24

See Medieval Monuments in Kosovo (UNESCO/NHK), https://youtu.be/5Q6DzpisSOM
Stefan Nemanja, head of the Nemanjić Dynasty and the Grand prince of Serbia, and his son Saint Sava (Rastko
Nemanjić) founded the Hilandar in 1198. Both Stefan (as monk Symeon) and Sava retreated to Hilandar after
retirement from church and state affairs. Hilandar became the center of medieval Serbian culture, periodically
reactivated in later centuries in support of Serbia’s foreign policy. See Dimitrije Bogdanović, Hilandar.
(Beograd: Jugoslovenska revija, 1978); Radmila Radić, “Hilandar u državnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije i Jugoslavije
1886-1970. godine,” Službeni list SRJ, Beograd, 1998.
25
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possibly match the historical importance of the four holiest and oldest churches and monasteries
of Old Serbia. The two, like the Gračanica Memorial Church at the Kosovo battlefield and other
sacred historic landmarks of Kosovo, are relevant, yet they do not make Kosovo the place of the
state’s origin and foundation or “cradle” of Serbia.
Most importantly, the old Serbia and its main shrines are associated with the highest Serb
Orthodox saintly cult of Saint Sava (Rastko Nemanjić). Sava, the founding father of the state,
church, and nation lived in Serbia, travelled to Jerusalem and Greece, died in Bulgaria, and
probably never visited Kosovo. Sava mediated in dynastic feuds and obtained an independent
church via diplomacy balancing between the Ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinopolis and
Rome. Sava’s cult celebrates an independent statehood and church autonomy won by diplomacy.
The oldest preserved portrait of Saint Sava as the first Serbian archbishop is a fresco from the
Ascension church of Mileševa monastery, foundation of Serbian king Vladislav, 1222-1228. This
monastery was Sava’s original burial place yet his major memorial temple was built in Belgrade
commemorating Ottoman Turkish ritual burning of Sava’s relics in the sixteenth century. St.
Sava is also the founder of what would be later described as a “Serbian Jerusalem”—a chapel
and guesthouse for Serb pilgrims to the Holy Land.26
When the early Serbian kingdom was well established, the Church’s seat relocated to
Kosovo, which signifies not the birth or foundation but the kingdom’s expansion into an empire.
This stage developed under the emperor Dušan the Mighty who was the most powerful of all
Serb rulers yet never became a saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Church’s seat
relocated to Peć (Ipek) in Kosovo exemplifies two things: first, the domination of Serbs over the
neighboring Balkan peoples under Dušan the Mighty and second, the survival of some form of
Dinko Davidov, Serbs and Jerusalem (Srbi i Jerusalim), edited by Jovo Vukelić, art editor Dobrilo M. Nikolić,
(Belgrade: Politika AD, 2007).
26
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Serb self-government under Ottoman rule. Imperial Kosovo is associated with the rise of Stefan
Uroš IV Dušan, Dušan the Mighty, King of Serbia, 1331-1346 and self-proclaimed Emperor of
the Serbs, Bulgars, Romanians, Greeks, and Albanians, (1346-1355).27 Incidentally, Dušan came
into a conflict with the Church and was never canonized. After the Great migration of Serbs in
1690, the patriarchate relocated from Kosovo to northwestern Balkans under Austrian Habsburg
authority. If Serbia could have two national “cradles” or founding centers that could be only the
earlier described St. Sava’s medieval state versus modern Serbia. Modern Serbia was created at
the new church seat at Sremski Karlovci (in the present-day Vojvodina), relocated to the new
political capital of Belgrade when Serbia became an independent state recognized and expanded
at the Congress of Berlin 1878. In the nineteenth century, the Serbian state revived in official
patriotic rituals and through schooling, the mythical narrative about the 1389 battle at the
Kosovo Filed and the downfall of the empire. The narrative about the Kosovo battle and the
lamentations over the lost empire have been since commemorated on state and church holiday—
Vidovdan or Saint Vitus Day. Out of these commemorations rose a nation building ideology
seeking expansion and restoration of the size and power of the medieval empire.
There are several references to Jerusalem as the Christian Holy City and Holy Land (in
the Middle East) in Serbian folklore and history. Yet none of these references could be taken as
the precursor to the contemporary meanings and connotations of the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem”
referring to Kosovo. First, there is a mention of Jerusalem in the epic narrative about the 1389
Kosovo battle to suggest that the heroic Prince Lazar received a divine message from the Holy
On the eve of the 1346 coronation, Dušan raised the Serbian archbishopric to the status of a patriarchate, the
highest religious authority in Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The new patriarchate moved to Peć, town in
western Kosovo, (Pejë, formerly Ipek). The Archbishop of Peć was titled Serbian Patriarch, and his seat
at Monastery of Peć became Patriarchal residence. Under Otoman rule, when Serbia virtually ceased to exist as a
state, the patriarchate at Peć was recognized by Turkish authorities as an authority representing not only Serbs but
all Christians in that part of empire.
27

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6

36

Land. 28 Second, as mentioned earlier, there is the chapel and pilgrim’s guesthouse that St. Sava
had built in Jerusalem for Serb pilgrims and therefore a “Serbian Jerusalem” (in the Middle East,
not in Kosovo). Third, there is the expression of a “Serb Golgotha.” Church leaders sometimes
described the Kosovo battle in which most of the Serb nobility perished, and the subsequent life
under Muslim rule as a “Serbian Golgotha.”29 A similar phrase, namely, “the Albanian
Golgotha,” emerged out of the First World War. The Serbian army suffered heavy casualties as it
retreated to Greece across the Albanian mountains.30 Commemorating the First World War as
martyrdom and heroism of the Serbs comparable to the Kosovo battle, Patriarch Dimitrije
Pavlović in 1918 used the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem” referring to the island Corfu in Greece
where the Serbian army retreated during the war and recuperated for the liberation of Serbia. The
Patriarch urged Serbs for holy journeys to the isle with memorials and military graveyard, like
pilgrims go to Jerusalem. 31
After the First Balkan War of 1912 when Serbia militarily acquired Kosovo, the Serbian
state for the first time in history presented Kosovo to the world as a holy land of the Serbs in
order to legitimize military conquest. Church historian Dimitrije Bogdanović (in a book
published in the 1980s), argues that the idea of Kosovo as a holy land of the Serbs claimed by
Serbia before the world powers, was articulated after three Balkan wars in 1912-1913. The 1913

There is mentioning of Jerusalem in the Kosovo epic according to the following verses: “There flies, a grey bird, a
falcon, From Jerusalem, the holy; And in his beak, he bears a swallow. That is no falcon, no grey bird; But it is the
Saint Elijah. He carries no swallow; But a book from the Mother of God. He comes to the Tsar at Kossovo, He lays
the book on the Tsar’s knees . . .” Quoted from Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through
Yugoslavia, Introduction by Christopher Hitchens. (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 909-911.
29
Thomas A. Emmert, Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389. (Boulder: East European Monographs, New York:
Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1990).
30
Ljubinka Trgovčević, “The Kosovo Myth in the First World War,” in Ilija Konev, Sveti mesta na Balkanite.
(Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria: UNESCO, 1996, pp. 331–338); John Reed, “The War in Eastern Europe,” in The Collected
Works of John Reed. (New York: Modern Library, 1995), pp. 54-55.
31
“The real Serbian Jerusalem are the isles of Corfu and Vido,” according to Dragiša Drašković,“Srpski Jerusalim
su Vido i Krf,” in the Serbian daily Blic online 14. 06. 2009, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/reportaza/srpski-jerusalim-suvido-i-krf/1lnxc4f.
28
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international conference in London, seeking settlement for the post-war Balkans, heard the
following claims based on the historic and cultural rights of the Serbian ethnic minority in
Kosovo against the Albanian ethnic majority:
It was rightly said (in the Serbian Memorandum to the ambassadors of the European
Powers in London in 1913) that this territory is a kind of "Holy Land" for the Serbian
people… In the negotiations about territories and borders in Kosovo and Metohija at the
1913 conference in London, Serbia prioritized the historic, ethnographic, cultural and
moral criteria. These include the continuity of the Serb statehood and culture in Kosovo.
Therefore, Serbia emphasizes that the land on which stand the historic monasteries and
shrines such as the Patriarchate of Peć, the Dečani monastery and the Orthodox cathedral
at Đakovica, have always been a holy land for all Serbs. Hence, no Serb or Montenegrin
government would cede the holy land of the Serbs to the Albanians or anyone else. On
that point, the Serbian people will not make any concessions, transactions or compromise
…”32
Yet, the London conference was by no means fascinated with the Serb sacred heritage
and the mythical history in Kosovo, as Bogdanović implies. Neither did the Western powers take
seriously the historic and cultural rights of the Serbs in Kosovo to endorse the annexation of
Kosovo by Serbia. On the contrary, the world powers pursued Realpolitik by recognizing fait
accompli established by Serbia’s military occupation of Kosovo. Concurrently, the London
Conference (i.e. Britain and France), took into consideration Albanian nationalism and the
Albanian ethnic majority in the neighboring parts of the Balkans, to recognize a newly
established Albanian national state, the Kingdom of Albania.
The first published verbatim quote of the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem” referring to Kosovo
as a holy land of the Serbs, is most likely a 1939 newspaper article by general Milan Nedić, the
World War I hero and later the chief pro-Nazi collaborator presiding over a puppet regime in
occupied Serbia. In June 1939, on the occasion of the 550th anniversary of the Kosovo battle,
General Nedić wrote an article in the daily Politika about the Kosovo legacy as inspiration for
Dimitrije Bogdanović, Book about Kosovo (Knjiga o Kosovu). (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti,
1986), p. 34.
32
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the present. Nedić hoped for a massive resistance to the impending Nazi invasion, so he urged
Serbs to invoke the example of the hero Miloš Obilić, the sultan’s assassin amidst the Kosovo
battle. According to Nedić, “today, as dark clouds gather in the skies of Europe, we Serbs are yet
again returning to Kosovo, Serbian Jerusalem, and the eternal fountain of our vital stamina, to
smell the red flowers on the heroes’ graves and inhale the fighting spirt of Obilić.”33 Nedić was
no nationalist poet or writer; he was a military leader and he did not himself invent the “Serbian
Jerusalem” metaphor. He probably borrowed it from sermons and speeches of the then
increasingly influential religious nationalist and leading Serb theologian, later canonized saint of
the Serbian Orthodox Church, Bishop of Žića, Nikolaj Velimirović.
To summarize, “Serbian Jerusalem” exemplifies the nationalist practice of the invention
of tradition. The contemporary Serbian nationalist movement, focusing on the struggle for
Kosovo as seeking weapons in history, religion, and tradition, presented Kosovo as a “cradle” of
the nation and the original sacred center where medieval Serbian state was founded. Present-day
Serb nationalism intentionally disregarded or “forgot” the primacy of the historic center of the
medieval Serbian state which was outside Kosovo, and dwarfed the unquestionably major Serb
saintly cult of Saint Sava, worshiped as the Church’s founder, the state’s co-founder and the
religious mystic, Christian pilgrim, diplomat, and peacemaker. By contrast, contemporary
nationalism, planning for mass mobilization, war, and the replacement of Yugoslavia by a
Greater Serbia, prioritized the memory of the medieval empire, the militant saint Prince Lazar
and the avenger of Kosovo, sultan’s assassin Milos Obilić.
In addition to the invention of tradition, the contemporary Serbian nationalist movement
operating within a globalizing world, espoused new religious practices such as notably religious
Quoted from Ivan Čolović, Death on the Kosovo Field, p.317. General Milan Nedić (1877-1946), was sentenced
to death as a Nazi collaborator and executed by the federal government of the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
33
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nationalism. According to Roger Friedland, religious nationalism is “a set of discursive practices
by which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people whose collective
representation it claims are constituted as a singular fact.”34 Religious nationalism calls for a new
theocracy. It is an anti-liberal and anti-secular ideology influential since the 1970s that rejects the
modern secular type of nationhood as a de-secularized community organizing state and territory
according to religion and myth. Thus, according to Peter van der Veer’s research on contesting
territorial claims and religious monuments in northern India, “sacred sites are the physical
evidence of the perennial existence of the religious community and, by nationalist expansion, of
the nation. … The history of shrines, as told in religious tales, and established by archeological
evidence, is the history of the nation.”35 In the Balkans, religious nationalism, Dino Abazović
explains, following the destruction of multiethnic Yugoslavia, assisted the formation of an ethnoconfessional type of nationality and based on this service, wants to influence politics to decide on
the model of statehood and nationhood particularly opposing ethnoreligious pluralism and
secularism.36
In sum, Kosovo is not Serbia’s “cradle” but it symbolizes Serbia’s pre-modern “golden
age.” The discourse about the “cradle” of the state that integrated the people and paved the way
to nationhood combines two archetype nationalist myths: myth of ancient origins, and myth of
rise and fall. According to Pål Kolstø’s 2005 study on ethnic nationalist myths in the Balkans,
the key nationalist myths of the Balkan ethnic nations are the myth of antiquity (ancient origins,
deep historic roots of the nation), and the myth of golden age (the state’s rise and expansion and
Roger Firedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review of
Sociology, 27, 2001, pp. 125-152. See also Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,”
Nations and Nationalism, 18 (1): 2-20, January 2012, p.17.
35
Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994), p. 214.
36
Dino Abazović, For the Nation and for God: A Sociological Explanation of Religious Nationalism (Za naciju i
boga: Sociolosko odredenje religijskog nacionalizma). (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2006), p. 107.
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if applicable, collapse and commemoration).37 The recent nationalist discourse needed both
constitutive nationalist myths, namely the myth of the nation’s “cradle” (ancient origins) and of
the golden age of its expansion and glory followed by a tragic yet not forgotten downfall, for
contemporary purposes of mass mobilization aimed at reframing collective identity and restoring
the past glory preferably within the boundaries of the medieval empire. The invention of
tradition and the material evidence of the sacred heritage and religious symbols from the nation’s
golden age, have overall served well the purpose of the Serb mass mobilization for the
destruction of multiethnic Yugoslavia. Regarding the restoration of the empire (in contemporary
parlance called Greater Serbia), the results have been less successful. The Serb republic in
Bosnia-Herzegovina seems as the only palpable gain. Croatia emerged from the 1991-1995 SerbCroat war militarily strong and furiously anti-Serbian with its Serb minority largely “cleansed.”
Kosovo eventually seceded from Serbia and the local Serbs have been largely “cleansed.”
Although the sacred monuments are still there as reminders of the bygone empire and the
enduring Serbia’s imperial ambitions, they could not prove that Serbs “got there first.” On the
contrary, according to a number of impartial studies, the Albanians are presumably the
indigenous residents of the Balkans, sometimes linked to the ancient Illyrians, whose ethnic
name South Slavic nationalist movements had appropriated, settling in Kosovo and present-day
Albania long before the Slavic migrations of the seventh to ninth centuries.38 However, the actual
history is only one dimension of the Kosovo controversy. The Kosovo myth, as part of a
“religion of Serbian nationalism” as Ivan Čolović describes it, have since the nineteenth century
when Serbian secular and clerical elites began using it for state and nation-building, become an

37

Pål Kolstø, ed., Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe, (London: Hurst. & Company, 2005), pp. 19-21.
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a Short History, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999); Tim Judah, Kosovo: What
Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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autonomous socio-cultural phenomenon creating representations of the past or present that often
contradict reality.39

3.

Beyond the Holy Land: Inventing a Serbia-Israel Special Relationship
The Serbian nationalist movement destabilizing Yugoslavia in the 1980s anticipated

ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and subsequent all-Serb re-colonization of the “holy land.” In
preparation, Belgrade media and nationalist leaders accused the majority Albanians of no less
than genocide. It has been allegedly carried out by terror and expulsion of the Serb minority in
order to create an ethnically homogenous Kosovo to eventually unite with Albania. Actually,
Albanian nationalism did not have such an agenda at the time, but today it does have, as the
consequence of the Serb assault. According to Belgrade propaganda, Albanians, mostly Muslims
by religion, hate Serbs as Christians who defended Kosovo from the Muslim conquest since the
mythical fourteenth century battle. The Albanians also allegedly envy Serbs on the wellpreserved historic monuments, churches, and holy relics as powerful material evidence
supporting territorial claims. The Serb nationalist movement of the 1980s created a state of siege
in the minds of the Serbs, allegedly threatened by growing genocidal nationalisms in the
neighboring peoples. In addition to the Albanian threat, Belgrade media and nationalist hawks
alleged, an awakened Croat nationalism aimed at finishing the genocide against Serbs begun in
World War II, while Bosnian Muslims, influenced by Islamic radicalism, wanted an Islamic state
in Muslim-populated areas of the Balkans. To make the growing Serb fears worse, Croats and
Bosnian Muslim national political, cultural, and religious institutions never explicitly condemned
those legacies. As the Yugoslav communist control eroded, the renewed historical controversies

39

Ivan Čolović, Death at the Kosovo Field, pp. 459-461.
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pressured the quarrelling ethnic communities.40 The Croat pro-Axis regime in the Second World
War indeed carried out a mass persecution of the Serb and Jewish minorities in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and a revisionist nationalist denial rose within Croat nationalism responding
to the pressure from Serbia.41
The Serbian Orthodox Church, as national institution that pioneered the contemporary
Serbian nationalist movement as early as the 1960s,42 contributed to the movement’s momentum
in the 1980s. The Church released two major publications covering the Kosovo theme and the
theme of genocide against Serbs in the Second World War, particularly at the concentration
camp Jasenovac in northern Croatia. In 1987, an illustrated encyclopedia cataloged several
hundred historic monuments, archeological sites, graveyards, medieval churches, and the
provinces of Kosovo and Metohija.43 The editors presented the monuments as invaluable yet
unprotected Serb heritage that the Albanian enemy aims to destroy. Again, Albanian nationalism
back then did not have such plans but it does have these plans today. Regarding the Croat
genocide theme, from 1986-1990, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church released
several publications about Croat fascist Ustasha movement’s concentration camps.44 The theme
See Tea Sindbaek, Usable History: Representations of Yugoslavia’s Difficult Past from 1945 to 2002, (Aarhus,
Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2012).
41
In spite of a massive propaganda, there is also voluminous multilingual objective scholarship on ethnic massacres
and genocide during the Second World War in the Balkans. See the following : Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein,
The Holocaust in Croatia, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, published in association with the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016); Slavko Goldstein, 1941: The Year that Keeps Returning, introduction
by Charles Simić, translated from the Croatian by Michael Gable, (New York: The New York Review of Books,
2013); Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. Occupation and Collaboration, (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the
Twentieth Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Anton Weiss-Wendt, ed., Eradicating Differences:
the Treatment of Minorities in Nazi-dominated Europe, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010); Lisa M.
Adeli, with a preface by Frederick Kellogg, Resistance to the Persecution of Ethnic Minorities in Croatia and
Bosnia during World War II,(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009).
42
Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols, chapters 3, 8 and 9.
43
Atanasije Jevtić et al., eds., Sacred Endowments of Kosovo: Monuments and symbols of the Serbian People
(Zadužbine Kosova: spomenici i znamenja srpskog naroda), (Belgrade: Eparhija Raško-Prizrenska i Bogoslovski
fakultet, 1987), pp. 831–842.
44
Eternal Memory - Jasenovac, the Place Soaked in the Blood of Innocents, with summaries in English, on the
fiftieth anniversary of Martyred Jesenovac and of the seventh anniversary of the Consecration of the new Church of
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was neither forbidden nor neglected under communism; yet, the new Serb nationalism offered
reinterpretations from the vantage point of the earlier suppressed ethnoreligious nationalism.
Now the newly discovered chief motive for the Croat Ustasha genocide was not the influence of
the Nazi-fascist ideology and proven Ustasha’s ties with Mussolini and Hitler, but the incitement
from the Vatican as the historic nemesis of the independent-minded Serbian Orthodox Church
which the Vatican allegedly attempted to convert into a Uniate Church.45 The inventor of this
thesis was the Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, later canonized saint of the Serbian Orthodox
Church. As an émigré anti-Yugoslav activist in the United States, Velimirović in the 1950s spoke
and wrote about Ustasha genocide in the Second World War. He explained it as the crime
motivated by religious hatred and envy between the two fraternal peoples, as in the biblical story
of Cain and Abel—the Orthodox Serbs likened to the latter and the Catholic Croats to the
former.46 Velimirović concluded that Croats, because of the communist atheistic rule and the
influence of Ustashas in their ranks, have never properly repented. Hence he proposed a Temple
of Atonement to be built at the Jasenovac concentration camp memorial site as a place for
interfaith pilgrimages after the fall of communism and reconciliation of the Churches (provided
the Catholics repented). Yet, in consequence of the Serb-Croat war of 1991-1995, post-war
Serbia and Croatia wrote new histories that cemented the conflict.
A prominent contributor to the new discourse of Serbian nationalism was, among others,
Enriko Josif, a Yugoslav intellectual of Jewish background and co-chairman of the national
Jewish Association. Josif, an anti-Catholic, blaming the Vatican for not opposing the Holocaust,
had introduced in public discourse a parallel between the Jasenovac concentration camp and
the Nativity of St. John the Baptist - Memorial Church Jasenovac, (Belgrade: Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, 1990).
45
See the details in Balkan Idols, chapter 9.
46
Ibid.
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Auschwitz.47 The Serbian Orthodox Church utilized his ideas such as the following: “One of the
horrible spiritual crimes is the fact that what happened to the Serbs was hushed up in the whole
world. This is a postwar continuation of the horrible crime … The worst service to the West, and
particularly to the Roman Catholic Church of the Croats, was to hush up the religious and
biological crime of genocide committed against the Serbian people during World War II. In the
name of Christ and Christian love, the head of the Roman Catholic Church should have raised
his voice and condemned the eternal sin of Cain. This should be done as soon as possible.”48
Serbian secular and clerical nationalists further developed the Serb-Jewish parallel. A
version of the Serbo-Jewish parallel came from Serb Orthodox priest , Žarko Gavrilović: “the
Serbs are the greatest martyrs of humankind …,” because, “no other people in the world, except
the Jews, have suffered so much for their faith and nation …49 Writer Dobrica Ćosić, a former
Yugoslav communist who broke up with the party over the Kosovo controversy, as an emerging
chief ideologue of contemporary Serbian nationalism, stated in a 1983 interview, “the Serb is the
new Jew at the end of the twentieth century.”50 Ćosić claims to be the first to propose a territorial
partition of Kosovo between Serbia and Albania. In one of his last interviews before his death in
2014, he argued that he had been proposing the partition of Kosovo between Serbia and Albania
for more than four decades but nobody took it seriously.51 According to another source, Ćosić
published a blueprint for partition of Kosovo as early as 1994 in the Italian journal for

47

See for example, Vladimir Dedijer, Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs
During World War Two, documents selected and compiled by Vladimir Dedijer, translated by Harvey L. Kendall,
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992).
48
Quoted in Balkan Idols, pp.124-125.
49
Ibid.
50
Quoted in Balkan Idols, p.124.
51
“Ćosić: Partition of Kosovo is the Only Solution” (Ćosić: Podela Kosova jedino rešenje”), Belgrade,
BETA,29.05.2011, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=515183.
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geopolitics, “Limes.”52 Subsequently, Serbian nationalist leaders proposed to the Alabamians and
the international community, several plans for partitioning Kosovo.53
History since the emergence of those partition plans, as well as earlier analogous
experiences, has shown that territorial settlements in the Balkans never worked out without war
and ethnic cleansing. Dobrica Ćosić was by no means the only one among Balkan ethnic
nationalist to consider partitions. Two other prominent nationalist separatist leaders such Bosnian
Muslim lawyer Alija Izetbegović and Croat historian Franjo Tudjman developed similar plans
from the perspectives of their respective ethno-confessional communities. As early as 1970,
Izetbegović secretly published (and was later jailed for that by a Yugoslav court) a blueprint for
partition of Yugoslavia proposing the model of the partition between India and Pakistan.54 The
historian Tudjman published in 1981 a paper predicting fragmentation of a number of European
nation-states into smaller ethnically homogenous units, which he considered “natural” and all
other types of nationhood artificial.55 Tudjman predicted triumphant separatist movements and
partitions not only in the Balkans but also in Western Europe. In his subsequent works on
genocide, Tudjman even drew analogies between Serbian and Israeli nationalism to argue that
Serbs and Jews invented myths about their nations’ collective suffering and persecution in which
they magnified the actual number of victims. In a revised U.S. edition of this book, Tudjman,
then president of Croatia, softened these allegations in order to improve Croatia’s international
reputation as a newly founded nation.56

“Partition of Kosovo is the Ultimate Goal of Serbia” (“Podela Kosova krajnji cilj Srbije”), Blic online, Belgrade,
01.10. 2008.
53
Nexhmedin Spahiu, “Serb Proposals for Partitioning Kosova,” Central Europe Review, Vol 1, No 1, 28.06.1999.
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Alija Izetbegović, The Islamic Declaration (Islamska deklaracija), Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990.
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Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, (Boulder: East European Monographs, New York:
distributed by Columbia University Press, 1981).
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Franjo Tudjman, Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy, translated from Croatian by Katarina
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Arguably, the year 1985 was the moment of the invention of the idea of “Serbian
Jerusalem” as the parallel between Kosovo and Israel behind which unfolds the Serb-Jewish
special relationship as two martyr-nations persecuted by Nazis and Muslims in the past and
present. The inventor of this “Serbian Jerusalem” is the writer Vuk Drašković a former
communist-turned ethnic nationalist. Like Dobrica Ćosić or Slobodan Milošević, Drašković used
to be a senior Yugoslav communist official deserting the party for allegedly not protecting Serb
national rights within the federation. In 1985, Drašković published an open letter to Israeli
writers outlining a new history according to which Serbs and Jews have suffered and were hated
and martyred as independent-minded, being faithful to their identity, religion, and tradition.
According to Drašković, Serbs are the thirteenth lost and the most ill-fated tribe of Israel; the
archeological traces of the ancient Serb and Jewish kingdoms can be found in the two holy lands
of Kosovo and Israel-Palestine; Kosovo is therefore “Serbian Jerusalem.” The five centuries of
Serb stateless life under Muslim Ottoman Turkish rule Drašković describes as “the Babylonian
Captivity,” and the Great Migration of Serbs from Kosovo as the biblical Exodus, etc. Drašković
also informed Israeli writers that Yugoslav Jews and Serbs shared the same fate in World War II
as victims of genocide carried out by Croat and Bosnian Muslim pro-Nazi and fascist ethnic
militia. Drašković implies that Serbs and Jews have the same common enemies today as they had
in the Second World War and must help each other.57 Twenty years later, appearing on a
television show in the Bosnian Serb republic, Drašković claimed that in the 1980s he had
invented “that Serbian Jerusalem metaphor.”58

See Marko Zivkovic, “The Wish to be a Jew: The Power of the Jewish Trope in the Yugoslav Conflict,” Cahiers
de l’Urmis [Online], 06.03.2000, http://urmis.revues.org/323.
58
According to Drašković’s statement on talk show “Ćirilica” (“The Cyrillic Alphabet”), on BN television, 1 April
2013, retrieved on 14 July 2015, on youtube link: https://youtu.be/erOEKnnEdl8.
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In his letter, Drašković reinterpreted history borrowing from the past whatever he could
use in the present. He, for example, omitted to inform the Israeli public opinion that a wartime
Serbian pro-Nazi puppet regime under General Nedić and the native Serb fascist Dimitrije Ljotić,
helped the Nazi occupiers annihilate Serbia’s Jewish population. Actually, Drašković led a
political party that proposed rehabilitation of Nedić as a hero of anti-communist struggle. In
addition, Drašković probably borrowed the “Serbian Jerusalem” phrase referring to Kosovo from
Nedić’s 1939 article published in the Belgrade daily “Politika” while the original inventor is
most likely the religious nationalist Bishop Velimirović, yet another Drašković’s hero.59
The nationalist media in Serbia, borrowed and expanded Drašković’s metaphors and
parallels, such as the following 1986 article: “The Jews … people who have been for nearly 2000
years denied by European states to serve in the military and choose military professions, have
today one of the best organized and best armed, also perfectly trained and best combat-ready
military forces in the world. The Israeli army’s superiority has been successfully tested in wars
they won against far more numerous enemy armies. This is what kind of military force Serbia
needs today in order to protect Kosovo Serbs and Orthodox Christian shrines from the Muslim
threat …”60 In short, by the outbreak of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the Serbian Jerusalem and
Serbia-Israel parallels have become additions to the new discourse of contemporary Serbian
nationalism.
Students of Serbian nationalism observed the impact of the “Serbian Jerusalem” idea and
the comparisons between Serbs and Jews. Analyzing these narratives in the context of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars of the 1990s, political scientist Jasna Dragović-

Quoted in Čolović, Death on the Kosovo Field, p.317.
Mirko Klarin and Raul Tajtelbaum, Israel in a Verbal Civil War (Izrael u verbalnom građanskom ratu), (Beograd,
1986), pp. 10. Quoted according to Vladimir Veljković, “Kosovo is a Serbian Jerusalem” (Kosovo je srpski
Jerusalim,” Peščanik, 28.11.2015, http://pescanik.net/kosovo-je-srpski-jerusalim/.
59
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Soso noted that, “Kosovo allowed the Serb nationalist intelligentsia” … “to adopt the role of
guardians of both national and universal values—the vision of Kosovo as the ‘Serbian
Jerusalem’, a holy land of an inestimable importance to national identity.”61 Similarly, social
anthropologist Marko Živković wrote: “The ‘Jewish trope’ … was one of the most important of
…the elements of Serbian national narratives, especially in linking the central Serbian myth of
Kosovo to the more recent cycle of narratives that focus on the Ustasha genocide against Serbs
during the Second World War.”62
The discourses on Serbian Jerusalem and the Serb-Jewish comparisons reached a
pinnacle during the Serbo-Albanian war in Kosovo (1998-1999) and the NATO bombing of
Serbia in spring of 1999. Under the nationalist Slobodan Milošević (1987-2001), a Belgradebased organization named “Serb-Jewish Friendship Society” served as the regime’s lobbying
tool in Israel and the United States. Founded in 1987—the year when Milošević took power, and
controlled by Milošević’s secret police, the society mobilized several thousand members in
Serbia, Israel, and the United States. Klara Mandić, a retired Belgrade dentist and Holocaust
survivor, served as the society’s president and chief spokesperson. Joining the vehement
campaign against Marshal Tito’s legacies in Serbia, the society attacked the pro-Palestinian
course as one of hallmarks of Tito’s foreign policy urging Milošević’s Yugoslavia and Serbia to
upgrade relations with Israel. The society appropriated the Serbian Jerusalem discourse using it
to defend the Serb territorial claims and Milošević’s repressive policies in Kosovo. During the
Serb-Albanian war of 1998-1999 in Kosovo and the NATO bombing of Serbia, a society’s
American representative addressed Jewish-American audience with the following ideas:
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As you know, Serbs compare Kosovo to Jerusalem. Yet, to the Serbs, Kosovo means
even more than Jerusalem to the Jews. Kosovo is also the Serb Masada. There was a
battle at Kosovo in 1389, the Serbian kingdom’s last stand against the Ottoman Empire in
which many thousands of Serbs—every Serbian soldier in the battle—were killed. In
many ways … the Balkans are like the Middle East, when neighbor is fighting neighbor.
A common saying there is, "It’s me against my cousin, and my cousin and me against the
world.63
The Serb-Jewish Friendship Society shared the fate of the Milošević regime. After
Milošević’s fall and arrest by the Hague war crimes tribunal, Mandić was murdered in 2001 in
Belgrade under mysterious circumstances. However, the small Serbia’s Jewish community was
not the same as the Serb-Jewish Friendship society. Actually, most Yugoslav intellectuals of
Jewish origin openly backed Serbia’s resistance against Milošević. For example, internationally
acclaimed authors Danilo Kiš, Filip David, and Oskar Davičo, among others, contributed with
statements and writings to the anti-Milošević opposition in Serbia.64 Likewise, the Yugoslav
sociologist of Jewish origin, Laslo Sekelj argued that the Milošević regime was essentially antiSemitic insofar as its supporters involved a number of outspoken anti-Semitic right-wing
nationalist and racist groups including the zealots of the Serbian Orthodox Church.65
Israeli public opinion followed and occasionally commented on the parallels and ideas
coming to the Middle East from the Balkans. Some Israeli circles showed sympathies to the Serb
cause in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, yet, the State of Israel supported the United States that
found Serbia chiefly responsible for the war and massive human right violations in the Balkans.
Regarding the Arab population in Israel, they supported Bosnian Muslims and condemned the
Serb atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, during the Bosnian war, Israeli government

“Another side to the story of Kosovo,” by Pauline Dubkin Yearwood, Jewish World Review, 19.04.1999,
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came under pressure from its Muslim population to accept Bosnian Muslim refugees.
Consequently, a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees found shelter in Israel, including a later
popular Balkan hip-hop artist Edo Maajka.66
However, as U.S. Balkan policies paved the way to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and
an independent Albanian republic, Israel supported Serbia’s effort to block Kosovo’s statehood.
In Israeli perspective, the Kosovo secession would encourage Palestinian Arab separatism in
Israel. In 2006, the writer Vuk Drašković, now serving as Serbia’s foreign minister, visited
Jerusalem and managed to obtain Israeli promises not to recognize independent Kosovo. In
Israel, Drašković received a warm welcome. According to the Jerusalem Post, “Drašković as
Serbia’s foreign minister (described Kosovo) as the ‘Serbian Jerusalem’ because of its central
place in Serbian history and religious tradition. Drašković said the parallels between the
experiences and treatment of Israel and Serbia by the international community should draw the
two countries together. Drašković … will be visiting Jerusalem's Old City, Nazareth and Galilee
… will meet with representatives of the Orthodox Church but not Palestinian officials.”67
With proclamation of Kosovo independence nearing, an Israeli journal called for caution
warning about foreign policy precedents that might apply to the Palestinian Arabs’ long quest for
statehood: The so-called "Serbian Jerusalem": Kosovo is not just a part of Serbia but also "the
cradle of its nationalism and culture." If the "Serbian Jerusalem" is taken away from it, why
should "Al Quds" not be taken from us in the future and become the capital of the independent

According to the New York Times, “Arabs in Israel and in other parts of the Middle East have been castigating
foreign governments for not aiding Muslim refugees from Bosnia. Mayors of Arab villages here at first welcomed
the Israeli decision to accept a group of Bosnians, but some later reversed themselves, apparently under pressure
from the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arab groups … We have reached the conclusion that this is an
operation aimed at improving Israel's image, which has been tarnished by the Palestinian deportations,” said Ahmed
Tibi, spokesman for a committee of Arabs who were initially planning to help settle the refugees in Arab
communities.” Stephen Kinzer, “Israel Accepts 84 of Bosnia's Muslim Refugees,” The New York Times, 18.02.
1993, at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/18/world/israel-accepts-84-of-bosnia-s-muslim-refugees.html.
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Palestine? The danger of Islam: The establishment of Kosovo will award a prize to a violent
ethnic-religious minority, whose leaders have ties to the Mafia and to the global jihad.
Recognizing them will increase Islamic influence and will strengthen anti-Semitic and antiIsraeli opinions in Europe. …The Kosovar analogy does not resemble the Israeli-Palestinian
situation Jews (or at least some of them) are willing to compromise in Jerusalem whereas the
Serbs are refusing to relinquish "their heart and soul.” “Today Serbia—tomorrow Israel: Israel
must oppose the perception whereby a political and territorial conflict can be ended by means of
an external, imposed solution and without the support of both sides to the conflict. If not, who
will guarantee that in the future Israel will not have a solution with the Palestinians imposed
upon it?68
Since 2008, Kosovo has become an independent state recognized by several dozen
nations yet not by Israel and countries fearing separatist nationalist movements (e.g. Spain).
Kosovo Albanians tried to emulate the Serb tactics of wooing Israel using the motive of common
suffering. In 2013, Kosovo Albanian politician and former Prime Minister Enver Hoxhaj visited
Jerusalem in a hope to convince Israel to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign nation. The Jerusalem
Post reports, that according to Hoxhaj “there are some similarities between Kosovo and Jews in
terms of their suffering,” yet the journal concludes,” despite Kosovo’s open admiration for Israel,
Palestinian unilateralism and ties with Russia make recognition of the Balkan state difficult for
Jerusalem.”69

“Kosovo in Israeli eyes,” Haaretz, 19.12.2007, at www.haaretz.com.
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02. 2015.
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A number of Israeli scholars and Western researchers of Israel and Jewish issues have
noticed the manipulation with the Holocaust and the uses of the Jews in the Balkan conflict.70
Concurrently, the Simon Wiesenthal Center maintained a special focus on the Balkans reporting
on anti-Semitism, historical revisionism, and right-wing nationalist extremism in all former
Yugoslav states.71 Israeli scholars showed particular interest in the neo-fascist tendencies in postYugoslav Croatia and in the new radical Islamism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Simon
Wiesenthal Center noticed Croat government’s tolerance of neo-fascism and anti-Semitism.72
Israel and several EU countries filed protests with the Croatian government after numerous antiSemitic public statements and denials of the Holocaust. In April 2016, the United States
dispatched to Croatia Ambassador Nicholas Dean, the State Department’s special envoy for
Holocaust issues who pressured Croatia’s president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović to make a
television appearance condemning Croat Ustasha crimes in World War II and calling for a better
education about the Holocaust in Croatia.73 When the 2015, a right-wing Croatian party returned
to power, Ephraim Zuroff, historian and Wiesenthal Center’s representative in Eastern Europe
wrote about “the return of evil in Croat history.”74 The World Jewish Congress announced an
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international conference on Holocaust in World War II Croatia, the Ustasha concentration camp
Jasenovac, and the recent Croatian historical revisionism.75 However, no Israeli or any other
Western observer of contemporary Croatian politics, have observed that the Croatian right-wing
nationalist parties, much like their counterparts in Serbia, admire the Israeli army and policies of
the State of Israel against Arabs in Palestine. For example, Croatia’s newly appointed
commissioner for veteran affairs addressed his supporters in these words: “With the Church and
God on our side we can succeed! Croatia’s role model will be Israel!”76 Another member of the
new Croat cabinet, the leader of a far-right party, argued in a TV interview: “we are like Israel,
Croatia lives in a strange surrounding … there is danger of new wars with Serbia …”77
In sum, political manipulations with the Holocaust and various “uses of the Jews” are
neither new nor surprising practices on the part of religious extremists, nationalists, and
historical revisionists. Regarding the recent Serbian nationalism’s strategy aimed at the making
of a “special relationship” with Israel as an ally of post-Yugoslav Serbia capable of assisting
Serbia in the acquisition of Kosovo and fighting Muslims and neo-Nazis elsewhere, the effort
has produced ambiguous results. Only some private Jewish circles and individuals took the risk
of involvement with the worldwide discredited Balkan nationalist politics. Regarding the
government, Israel would show cautious support or sympathies for some initiatives, provided it
would not contradict interests of the State of Israel. Finally, there is another reason why Serbia
could never fully succeed in the making Israel a close ally and that reason is called Russia, never
a friend of Israel. Abandoning Marshal Tito’s politics of balancing between Russia and the West,
“World Jewish Congress against Historical Revisionism in Croatia” (“Židovski kongres protiv revizionizma u
Hrvatskoj”), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23.10. 2017, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/holokausthrvatska/28813238.html.
76
“Secretary Crnoja after Benediction Took Office. Croatia’s Role model will be Israel” (“Crnoja uz blagoslov
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Serbia restored the old Slavic brotherhood with Russia. Concurrently, each of the new Balkan
states breaking out of Yugoslavia sought its respective “kin country” internationally. The term
come from Samuel P. Huntington who describes post-Cold War international alliances as
cultural or civilizational alliances with a crucial role for religion (e.g. the Orthodox Christian
Russians and Serbs; Bosnian Muslims and Turks; Catholic Croats and the Vatican, etc.)78 Thus,
at least at the symbolic level, in ceremonial discourses and Church relations, the new postcommunist Russia-Serbia romance has been one of most remarkable features of post-communist
Eastern Europe where everyone except Serbia continued to hate Russia. In reality, as Veljko
Vujačić shows in a recent comparative study of Russia and Serbia, in the post-communist phase
the two repeated the learning about their similarities as well as differences.79

4.

From a Balkan Affair to the Clash of Civilizations
“Sacred sites are the physical evidence of the perennial existence of the religious
community and, by nationalist expansion, of the nation … The history of shrines, as told in
religious tales, and established by archeological evidence, is the history of the nation.”
—Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 1994
A “cosmic war” is an imagined battle between metaphysical forces- good and evil, right
and wrong, order and chaos- that lies behind many cases of religion-related violence in the
contemporary world. These transcendent spiritual images have been implanted onto the social
and political scene, magnifying ordinary worldly conflict into sacred encounter…
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Veljko Vujačić, Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the Dissolution of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
79

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6

55

—Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence, 2003
Let there be an endless struggle … Let there be what cannot be … On the grave, flowers
will grow … For a distant future generation …
—Prince-Bishop of Montenegro Petar II Petrović –Njegoš (1847)
“Serbian Jerusalem” at face value looks a folk or pop cultural product, although it came
“from above,” invented by the new post-communist Serb elite. Initially known only by close
observers of the downfall of Yugoslavia, the phrase gained currency internationally during the
NATO Balkan intervention and ensuing diplomatic battles over Kosovo independence. Although
the metaphor and the Serb-Jewish comparisons are brainchildren of secular nationalists, the
influence of religion has continuously increased since the movement’s origins. Often criticized
for sectarian tendencies and an excessive ethnocentrism, the Serbian Orthodox Church in a postcommunist globalizing world, welcomed the internationalization and globalization of the Kosovo
controversy. Like the former communists turned-nationalists seeking the same utopian thinking
and authoritarian state they got used to yet only under different symbols and expressed by
different discourses, Balkan clerical nationalists found the Jerusalem parallel, the Jewish
analogies and comparative genocide, eye-opening global perspectives. Accordingly, the postcommunist Serbs disillusioned with Yugoslavia and seeking a new identity, could be reimagined as one of the most righteous, holy, and martyred nation in the world. In addition, global
and comparative perspectives helped a regional affair in the notorious European periphery to
become a global issue. Concurrently, from the Yugoslav collapse and the Balkan wars to the first
decade of the twenty-first century, Serbian religious nationalism merged with a global
resurgence of religion discovering new challenges and rivals in the rising fundamentalisms,
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public and radicalized religions. The Serbian Church’s espousal of the discourse on Serbian
Jerusalem and the Serb-Jewish analogy reached a pinnacle under the Patriarchate of the ardent
religious nationalist Irenej Gavrilović enthroned in 2010 and has advanced ever since ignoring
critics from some clerical and secular circles.
It is nonetheless worth noting that several Serb religious leaders and intellectuals refused
to accept “Drašković’s metaphor,” its meanings and accessories. They found it inappropriate,
confusing or at least awkwardly applied. Thus, the Serbian Patriarch Pavle (1990-2009),
indicated that if there existed such a thing as “Serbian Jerusalem,” it should be about the saintly
Church’s founder St. Sava and his original gravesite at the Mileševo monastery (which is in
central Serbia and therefore, geographically, outside Kosovo).80 In other words, Jerusalem as
metaphor denotes the holiest place—for the Serbs that must be the memorial site dedicate to the
holiest among the saints, namely Saint Sava, therefore either the original gravesite at the
Mileševo monastery or the Memorial Saint Sava temple in Belgrade. Similarly, the Serb
religious scholar Mirko Đorđević, argued that because of the strong influence of secular
nationalism on religion and church in Serbia, the main cult of St. Sava to inspire the faithful as a
wise but not warlike statesman, diplomat, and peacemaker, was intentionally overshadowed by
the cult of Prince Lazar martyred in the Kosovo battle of 1389 who symbolizes war and sacrifice.
According to Đorđević, the Serbian Jerusalem discourse is not a religious but a quintessential
nationalistic idea that invokes the emperor Dušan the Mighty and the old Serb imperial dream of
state expansion across the Balkans restoring borders from the fourteenth century.
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Indeed,

Bishop Teodozije of Raška-Prizren invoked Dušan’s empire in a sermon held in April 2011 at
the historic city of Prizren in Kosovo, which used to be Emperor Dušan’s capital: “The city of
Radmila Radić, Patriarch Pavle, A Biography (Patrijarh Pavle, biografija). (Beograd: Tanjug-Novosti, 2005).
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Prizren is our Jerusalem and our Constantinople. It used to be imperial capital of Tsar Dušan the
Mighty with its holy shrines and its beauty to which the Serbs return while returning to
Kosovo.”82
Yugoslav writer Mirko Kovač, in his collection of essays on Serbian nationalism noted
yet another interpretation of the Serbian Jerusalem metaphor. In a tourist guidebook to
northwestern Serbia, Kovač found description of what the people allegedly call “Serbian
Jerusalem,” namely the new pilgrimage site at the monastery Lelić in the hills overlooking the
town of Valjevo.
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In recent decades, Serbs have begun paying tribute to two radical Serb

clerical nationalists. Namely, the Lelić monastery is the burial place for two relatively recently
canonized Serbian saints, both ardent religious nationalists, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović and
Archimandrite Justin Popović. Celebrated today as anticommunists and great Serbs, their
fundamentalist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic teachings have become increasingly influential in
contemporary Serbia not only in church circles but also in intellectual life and public schools.
They represent the new Serbian nationalist elite, responsible for the invention of discourses such
as “Serbian Jerusalem,” and other ideas and myths that dragged Serbs and the neighboring
Balkan peoples into the wars to the 1990s.
Concurrently, while the Serb nationalist elite argue over the best application of the
Serbian Jerusalem metaphor and how to export it to the global political marketplace to Israel, the
United States, EU, and elsewhere; the re-traditionalized Serbian society embraces the theme in
folk music and popular culture. Thus, folk singer Milomir Miljanić Miljan, in his popular tune
“Serbian Jerusalem” released in 2014, laments over the destruction of Serbian shrines and
suffering of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. Among the comments to the video, reads the
“Episkop Teodosije: Prizren je srpski Jerusalim,” Nezavisne novine-Srna,
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/ex-yu/Episkop-Teodosije-Prizren-je-srpski-Jerusalim/87251
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following: “Serbia is going to be like it was in the age of the Dušan the Mighty Empire. Imperial
Serbia!!!”84
After the 2004 Albanian militants’ damage of the Serbian Church’s property and
monuments in Kosovo, the Belgrade government successfully lobbied the United Nations for the
protections of the Serbian medieval shrines and monuments. In 2006, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) released the following statement:
“The World Heritage Committee decided to extend the site of the Dečani Monastery by adding
to it three groups of churches, the Patriarchate of Peć Monastery, Gračanica Monastery, and the
Church of the Virgin of Ljeviša. The site is now to be known as Medieval Monuments in
Kosovo. The extended property, mainly dating from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was
also placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger due to difficulties in its management and
conservation stemming from the region's political instability. The Committee requested that the
State Party (Serbia) work with UNESCO programs, with the United Nations Mission to Kosovo
(UNMIK), and with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo in caring for the
site. The four edifices of the site reflect the high points of the Byzantine-Romanesque
ecclesiastical culture that developed in the Balkans between the thirteenth and seventeenth
centuries with its distinct style of wall painting. The Patriarchate of Peć Monastery is a group of
four domed churches, on the outskirts of Peć featuring series of wall paintings. The thirteenth
century frescoes of the Church of Holy Apostles are painted in an unique, monumental style.
Early fourteenth century frescoes in the church of the Holy Virgin represent the appearance of
the new so-called Palaiologian Renaissance style, combining the influences of the eastern
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Orthodox Byzantine and the western Romanesque traditions. The style played a decisive role in
subsequent Balkan art.”85
Since 2013, the Serbian church and state, have furthered the internationalization of the
Kosovo controversy emphasizing cultural diplomacy and using the Church’s connections abroad.
After a 2013 “Serbian Medieval Cultural Heritage Exhibition” at the House of Commons of the
British Parliament in London, UK, a church and state-sponsored world tour presenting the Serb
nationalist perspective on the Kosovo controversy, moved to the United States. After
presentation of the sacred heritage of Kosovo in New York City in January 2015,86 the Library of
Congress in Washington DC hosted a high delegation of Serbian Orthodox Church dignitaries
presenting a new English-language monograph “The Christian heritage of Kosovo and Metohija:
the Spiritual, Historical and Aesthetic Heart of the Serbian People.”87 The speakers at the event
were Bishop Maxim of the Western American Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North
America, Bishop Atanasije Jevtić from Serbia, and Archbishop Demetrios, Primate of the Greek
Orthodox Church of America. The Bishop Atansije Jevtić, one of leading clerical zealots in the
Balkans, urged “brothers Americans to understand better the cause and support the struggle for
the endangered heritage of the Christian civilization.”88 He stated:
In 2016 came the crown of Serbia’s imitation of the State of Israel’s policies in
Palestine. The Belgrade regime initiated the construction of settlements for Serbs
originally from the province who emigrated or have been expelled to Serbia by the
Albanians. In March 2016, the government of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo affairs,
announced a plan to relocate in Kosovo of 20,000 Serbs from Serbia through a project for
the construction of new settlements in the northern Serb enclaves of Kosovo, but also in
UNESCO, “World Heritage Committee puts Medieval Monuments in Kosovo on Danger List and Extends Site in
Andorra, Ending This Year’s Inscriptions,” 13.07.2006, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/268.
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ethnically cleansed areas including the traditionally Albanian-populated south. The first
Serb settlement labeled “Sunny Valley” is planned in the northern Serb enclaves of
Zvečan and Mitrovica. In June 2016, Serbia’s state-run news agency announced that
the Serbian government Office for Kosovo-Metohija … laid the cornerstone for a
residential complex for returnees to the Kosovo-Metohija municipality. The complex …
to become home to around 1,500 returnees named Sunny Valley, is expected to have 300
housing units and other buildings … the start of construction works marks the 17th
anniversary of the start of the Serb exodus from Kosovo in 1999 … not a project of
hatred against anyone, but a project of love for our own nation, aimed at alleviating the
consequences of ethnic cleansing, bloody expulsions and extermination of Serbs in
Kosovo …”89
Kosovo Albanians view Serbia as an imperialist and colonizing force of the past and
present. According to a western analysis of recent Balkan affairs, “authorities in Kosovo have
intensified their criticism against the settlements project, which consists of the construction of
300 homes in the North of Kosovo. According to them, the project which is funded by the Serb
government is political and it aims at changing the structure of population in the north of
Kosovo.”90 According to recent announcements by the Kosovo Albanian-dominated government,
the settlement is an unlawful activity and dangerous politics that must be halted.91 Meanwhile,
the construction continued and new ethnic clashes were reported around the Serb shrines in
Kosovo celebrating Christian holidays and Serb anniversaries.
Concurrently, the Serbian Orthodox Church organized pilgrimages to the holy land of
Kosovo, a new practice in Serbia’s culture and history. These patriotic tours of parishioners and
lay activists affiliated to the Church, visitors from the Serb diaspora, tourist groups, military and
police recruits, and school students, toured the historic Kosovo battlefield and the monasteries.
Attacked sporadically by Albanian extremists, the new Serb pilgrims and settlers helped the
“Cornerstone Laid for Returnee Residential Complex in Kosovo,” Tanjug Exactly, 9.06. 2016,
http://www.tanjug.rs/full-view_en.aspx?izb=250974.
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continuous nationalist mobilization in Serbia. Apparently, the Israeli Settler Movement and the
Israeli government’s construction of Jewish homes in occupied territories, have inspired Serbia’s
new Kosovo strategies.92 Overall, the dominant Serbian interpretation of the meanings of
Jerusalem, the Holy Land, and the history of mass persecution based on religious identity, have
been rather narrow, secularized, and politicized. Evidently, Serbian nationalism has become
essentially much closer to the post-1967 Israeli religious right and rightists Zionist groups, then
to the broader spiritual and cultural meanings of the Holy city and the Holy Land as world’s
heritage and places of encounters among civilizations.93
In sum, after losing wars in Kosovo and Croatia, while partly gaining only in BosniaHerzegovina, Serbian nationalism kept the regional focus by emphasizing memory and identity
battles and diplomacy. Now that the new status of Kosovo as a holy land of the Serbs has been
well established in Serbian post-Yugoslav collective identity and domestic politics and exported
on a global political scene, Patriarch Irenej, in the following three recent statements has
summarized the meaning of Kosovo for the Serbs today and what is to be done accordingly.
First, “Kosovo is not a geographic space but a holy land without which Serbia cannot
exist.”94 Second, “Serbia simply cannot surrender or give away Kosovo in a territorial exchange
or as a gift to anyone under any circumstances, Kosovo has always been ours and will remain
ours.”95 Third, “Kosovo is at present an occupied Serbian land. It cannot be traded, partitioned or
recognized as a foreign land but only liberated and returned to Serbia.” 96
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To implement this strategy, the Serbian government pursues political and cultural
diplomacy while the Church wages a holy war of its own in the Kosovo Republic while also
seeking and receiving support among friendly churches such as notably the Russian Orthodox
Church, the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate at Jerusalem, and the Orthodox Church of Greece.
This does not mean that Serbia has totally abandoned armed battles and wars for Kosovo. For
example, according to a publication titled Handbook for an Orthodox Soldier issued in 2012 by
the Serbian Army, “the (Serb) Orthodox soldier’s duty is to secure the places of worship and
establish stable conditions under which the Orthodox priest can celebrate the bloodless sacrifice
to the Glory of Our Lord for the sins of the people and his own …”97
Kosovo’s present statehood has been a result of a combination of factors including the
advancement of Albanian nationalism in Albania, Yugoslavia and subsequent Balkan ethnic
struggles, and foreign interventionism. The United States and NATO established near the
Kosovo town of Uroševac/Ferizaj, the largest military base in Eastern Europe, Camp Bondsteel.
The grateful Albanians posted a massive bronze statue of President Bill Clinton in the Kosovo
capital city of Priština and of Woodrow Wilson in the capital of Albania Tirana honoring the idea
of U.S. assistance to small nations’ self-determination. Tirana also named streets and plazas after
the two Bush presidents and, most recently, the Albanian town of Sarranda added a statue of the
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Concurrently in Serbia, anti-Americanism has grown as
well as pro-Russian sentiments.
In sum, Serbian nationalism has labored to “upgrade” the Kosovo controversy from an
ethnic conflict in Europe’s periphery into a global affair comparable to Palestine. As the
ethnologist Ivan Čolović has observed, the Kosovo myth is a state building project rather than
Handbook for an Orthodox Soldier (Priručnik za pravoslavnog vojnika), priređivač teksta Goran Marić,
recenzenti: pukovnik Vinko Markovski, protođakon mr Zlatko Matić, (Lapovo, 2012), p. 3. Quoted in
Veljković,“Kosovo je srpski Jerusalim,” Peščanik, 28.11. 2015.
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merely a folklore narrating the medieval battle and Church liturgy commemorating the canonized
warriors. Since the nineteenth century, Čolović notes that the Kosovo narrative has evolved into
an elite-constructed ideology and eventually imposed on the people as a religion of sorts in
which the nation and state are worshiped as holy icons.
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Čolović goes on to argue that the

national ideology using Kosovo as its banner is not an immutable mythology or tradition but a
changing material revised as it suits the state and church elite, and will be revised further to
adjust to the new globalizing world. In such a new world, according to Čolović, such ideologies
and cultures of memory cannot as earlier coexist separately and isolated from one another; hence
there will be more interactions among them including emulating, borrowing, and mutual
influences.99
Understanding recent changes of the discourse about Kosovo also requires observing the
post-communist and post-Yugoslav contexts. The new recent religious nationalist discourses
have become striking features of post-communist, re-traditionalizing, and de-secularizing, earlier
atheistic and anti-tradition modernizing societies. Unwilling to give up the privileged social
status, the elites of former regimes publicly used the new symbols, discourses, tropes, and
metaphors indicating the return of religion and tradition. The adoption of the religious
nationalistic discourses and the pretense of religious conversions have routinely served the
former communist elite to preserve the privileged social status and confirm identity mutation. As
noted earlier, many leading post-communist nationalists used to be prominent communists. Some
attempted religious conversions, other faked religiosity, and some simply used religion for
political gains while remaining atheistic and openly cynical to which many religious leaders
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responded favorably provided it served their clerical interests and the nationalist ideology they
consecrated. Thus, the Croat nationalist historian and Holocaust denier Franjo Tudjman, was a
retired Yugoslav communist army general turned into an ardent ethnic nationalist who made the
Catholic Church the actual co-ruler of the state he founded and made himself president.
Likewise, Slobodan Milošević, the communist-turned nationalist, as leader of post-communist
Serbia could not hide his despise for religion and clergy yet always posed before TV cameras in
the company of the Patriarch during every election campaign. Also, the chief Serb nationalist
ideologue, the writer Dobrica Ćosić, was once a member of the Communist Party Central
Committee. He never openly converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church yet worshiped in a
zealously religious fashion the Kosovo myth and all that Kosovo symbolizes in Serb nationalism.
Not to mention that the Serb nationalist writer Vuk Drašković, who claims to have invented the
“Serbian Jerusalem” metaphor, used to be a senior Yugoslav communist official, Chief of staff
under the (Croat) head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the 1970s. Likewise, the current
popular leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, the former communist secret agent, justifies the
Russian 2014 annexation of Crimea, in a religious nationalistic language emphasizing historic
rights and drawing parallels with Jerusalem. Putin asserted that Crimea has “sacred meaning for
Russia, like the Temple Mount for Jews and Muslims,” and that Crimea is “the spiritual source
of the formation of the multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation … It was on this spiritual soil
that our ancestors first and forever recognized their nationhood.”100
The second, post-Yugoslav context, unveils several new small European nation-states
succeeding a large nation that during the Cold War era acquired the influence and reputation in
international relations comparable only to European empires such as Austria-Hungary or
Ottoman Turkey at its heights. After the ethnic nationalist euphoria and wars of the 1990s, these
100
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new post-Yugoslav states woke up to grow increasingly frustrated as political and economic
dwarfs, struggling transitional states discredited by the International War Crimes Tribunal
sentences and exhausted by the prolonged nationalist strife and instability. The invention of
“Serbian Jerusalem” is an example how these new post-Yugoslav small, isolated, and sect-like
states vied for relevance, seeking way out of isolation and inferiority. The inventors and
practitioners of the “Serbian Jerusalem” and similar new nationalist discourses, hoped to
convince their domestic as well as foreign audiences of a greater importance in domains of
culture, history, religion and ideas, purportedly exceeding the country’s actual size and modest
economic and military potential. Similarly, Serbia’s nemesis Croatia, invented (with a little help
from the United States) an international initiative labeled The Three Seas Initiative. Presenting
the Initiative to Russian president Vladimir Putin, Croatia’s president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović
described Croatia as “a state small in size of its territory and population yet distinguished by its
talents, ambitions, and new original ideas such as The Three Seas initiative aimed to bridge the
chasm between Old and new Europe.”101
However, the new reality, after the disintegration of united Yugoslavia as a sizeable
European country with a notable influence in the Third World, has unexpectedly dwarfed the
small post-Yugoslav nations in a globalizing world. Nevertheless, their nationalist elites do not
even think of abandoning the key tenets of their ideologies including notably the exaggeration of
their importance in the world. According to historian Pål Kolstø’s study on nationalist myths,
Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and other small peoples of southeastern Europe have in common what
he terms antemurale myth, that is, mythologized historical narratives portraying them as small in
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size yet achieving great heroic and exceptional deeds and service in defense of the Western
civilization.102 Thus, both Serbs and Croats claim to have protected Christian Europe standing in
the first line of defense against the Muslim invader from the Middle East. Similarly, Serb
nationalism views Serbia as the principal initiator and the most heroic participant in the First
World War. Contemporary Serbian nationalism also finds a continuity of the Serbs’ sacrifice for
Christian Europe in defense against an aggressive Islam, from the 1389 battle at the Kosovo
Field to the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s.103 The post-Yugoslav Serbia,
Croatia, and other successor states of former Yugoslavia, except perhaps Slovenia, are
internationally insignificant, impoverished, depopulated, struggling states with corrupt
ineffective governments. While in Yugoslavia during the Cold War, they took for granted the
international reputation and influence that Marshal Tito’s regime had acquired which was lost
once Tito’s nation ceased to exist. After Yugoslavia, the new small ethnic nations’ inferiority
complex has worsened and the exaggerated religion and myth function as survival kits for life in
sect-like societies with a hostile and arrogant world paying no attention to them or even
despising them. Their identities changed and the pride once bolstered by the secular modernizing
and worldly Yugoslavia, turned into the pre-modern peasant mentality of small ethnoconfessional communities hating the neighbors while seeking approval from the significant
international political and religious authorities, states, nations, and empires.
Today, a presumably most useful role for Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia in international
relations may be to deter and discourage separatist and secessionist movements. In other words,
ethnic separatists and religious nationalists worldwide should cease their efforts unless they risk
ending up like Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and other pathetic leftovers of Yugoslavia. Pope Francis,
102
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Barack Obama, and several other world leaders, have recently warned of the risky separatist
nationalism manipulating temporary euphoria without realistically anticipating the consequences.
In 2014 and 2016, Pope Francis spoke about the danger of a “balkanization of Europe and the
world,” commenting on separatist tendencies in Scotland, Catalonia, and the Brexit.104
In present-day Serbia, for example, the nearly four decades of the nationalistic pressures
on society created some kind of a permanent state of siege, turning the one-time open and
worldly modernizing society into a sectarian and backward state in Europe’s periphery. Yet,
according to the Serbian nationalist regime and its allied national church, the worse the situation
gets, the greater becomes the influence of the new religious nationalism keeping them in power.
The Church teaches that remedy is an endless struggle and self-sacrifice, as lessons learned from
the Kosovo myth and Serbia’s sacred history. Church zealots often refer to the Prince-Bishop of
Montenegro Petar Petrović II-Njegoš according to whom collective self-sacrifice is necessary
and losses are only temporary, because, “there is no Resurrection without death,” hence, “Let
there be an endless struggle … Let there be what cannot be … On the grave, flowers will grow
… For a distant future generation …”105 The philosophy under consideration prevailed in Serbia
during moments of crisis, under foreign occupation or in wars. For a foreign observer, even in
the case of the most sympathetic visitors to Serbia like British novelist Rebecca West, some
features of “Balkan mentality” are appalling:
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On the Sheep’s Field I had seen sacrifice in its filth and falsehood, and in its astonishing
power over the imagination. There I had learned how infinitely disgusting in its practice
was the belief that by shedding the blood of an animal one will be granted increase; that
by making a gift to death one will receive a gift of life. There I had recognized that this
belief was a vital part of me, because it was dear to the primitive mind, since it provided
an easy answer to various perplexities, and the primitive mind is the foundation on which
the modern mind is built. This belief is not only hideous in itself: it pollutes the work of
love. It has labored for annulment of the meaning of Christianity, by insinuating itself
into the Church and putting forward, by loose cries and the drunkenness of ecstasy, a
doctrine of the Atonement too absurd to be set down in writing.106
In a similar vein, Serbian literary critic Miodrag Popović deconstructs the Kosovo myth
in the 1970s anticipating it as the fuel for new conflicts. He finds that Serbian nationalism fuses
“the real popular liberation and national emancipation struggle, with the surviving pagan
instincts and drives, such as revenge, torture, slaughter, sacrificial rituals and the symbolic
communication with heroic ancestors, thus indicating that the human society under consideration
harbors untamed mythical impulses and archaic behavioral patterns …” and concludes:
This kind of archaic, pre-modern, or simply, “barbaric” behavior, might have served the
purpose of community survival at some points in history, yet, if and when the mythical
archaic thinking becomes a lasting mental attitude, collective mentality or national
culture, institutionalized as a major national patriotic myth and a key collective identity
component, it may become fatal to the people incapable of resisting its pseudohistorical
spell. The contemporary nationalist intellectuals, captives of these myths and pseudo
histories, are not like the early Western European romantic nationalist poets; they present
the contemporary thought and the spirit of modern man running the risk of witnessing a
new Kosovo, facing the intellectual and ethical defeat.107
In a final analysis, the above described nationalist discourses and invented traditions
obscure the nation-building failure, social decay and longstanding conflicts that the nationalist
elite have created. Both Serbia and Kosovo are nearly failed struggling states. Serbs as well as
Albanians from both Kosovo and Albania join the regional waves of mass migration to Western
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Europe leaving many areas in the Balkan macro region virtually deserted.108 Concurrently, an
extremist Islamism advances in Muslim areas of the Kosovo, Macedonia, the Sanđak and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.109 Imported mainly from Saudi Arabia and other conservative gulf states,
Kosovo Islamism, according to a New York Times report, recruited 314 Kosovars, including two
suicide bombers, 44 women and 28 children—who have gone abroad to join the Islamic State,
the highest number per capita in Europe.110 According to an analysis based on a study of
Kosovars fighting in the war in Syria, their motives include young people’s lack of employment
and opportunities for normal life in their own country combined with the influences of ethnic
nationalist and militant Wahhabi and Jihad ideologies.111
Since 2004, Albanian nationalists in Kosovo have sporadically attacked Serb
monasteries, clergy, pilgrims and visitors. The international peacekeepers of the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) protect the Serb enclaves from Albanian extremists. The Serbian Church
asked for a permanent exemption from the local civilian administration, yet KFOR terminated
the operation entrusting the guard duty at the Serb monasteries and churches to the local
Albanian authorities. The move angered Serb nationalists and their Russian supporters. 112 At this
writing, Kosovo is formally a sovereign nation and even an EU candidate. Yet, five out of 28 EU
member states do not want to recognize Kosovo’s independence for the same reasons as Israel,
that is, to discourage secessionist movements such as in Catalonia, Scotland, and Palestine.
“More than 43% of the population has left Bosnia Herzegovina,” Al Jazeera Balkans, 2. 02. 2017,
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The Serbian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Irenej, approves the comparisons between
Serbs and Jews hoping for the support that Israel receives from the West and also to emphasize
what Marko Živković describes as the narrative of “eternal victimization.”113 In order to update
and “globalize” the victimization theme, the Church compares the suffering of the Serbs not only
with the Holocaust but also with Turkish genocide against Armenians in the First World War. In
August 2016, at a rally commemorating a massive Serb refugee movement from Croatia to
Serbia and Bosnia at the end of the 1991-1995 war, the Patriarch Irenej stated:
Today we remember the suffering of our people at hands of the Croat military and police
in the operation “Storm” in August 1995. The aim of that crime was to expel Serbs from
the provinces, towns and villages where they lived for many centuries and to cleanse
Croatia from Serbs and Orthodox Christianity. Thus continued the terror against Serbs in
Croatia from the Second World War. Then, we remember, in the Croat fascist Ustasha
state Serbs were murdered in concentration camps … the Ustasha regime even set up a
concentration camp for Serb children with more than 120,000 innocent child victims,
most of which died from hunger and thirst … Only Jews and Armenians, besides Serbs,
have seen such a Golgotha …114
The Serbian Church leader has repeated the Armenian analogy several times since. Thus,
in October 2017 during his visit to the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the patriarch made
the following statement, triggering protests from the Bosnian Islamic Religious Authority:
Wherever Serbs live, there is Serbia: not just in Serbia proper but in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Vojvodina, Montenegro and other places. All Serbs, wherever they live in the world,
should unite in the thinking about our people’s glorious history… The twentieth century
was so glorious yet tragic for the Serbs, that human history never recorded such a grave
suffering of a people. It seems that the suffering of the Serbs exceeded the gravity of the
calamities of Jewish and Armenian peoples…115
The patriarch’s reference to the Armenian genocide, along with the familiar Serb-Jewish
analogies, is the most recent update to the victimization theme and the Church’s adjustment to a
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globalizing world. The Church welcomes recent resolutions and pronouncements on the
Armenian genocide from the Vatican, Germany, France, and eleven other EU members.116
Apparently, the Church of Serbia is hoping for a similar international recognition regarding
genocide against Serbs during the Second World War in the wartime Croat pro-Nazi state. Pope
Francis has recently initiated a conference on this controversy between representatives of the
Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox Churches but the effort discontinued without an agreement.117
The two countries and their churches repeatedly tried to invite Israel as a judge but Israel
abstained. However, the Yad Vashem institution has twice denied petitions to give the Croat
Cardinal Stepinac—the church leader and the chief military vicar during the Ustasha state, whom
the Church wants to canonize for sainthood, the title “Righteous among the Nations.” In the
meantime, the image of an eternally suffering and morally righteous Serbia has been tarnished by
Serbia’s role in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. By now, it has been determined by international
war crimes tribunals and independent human rights groups that a large number of Serb political
and military leaders committed war crimes and ethnic cleansing against Bosniak Muslims,
Croats, and Albanians.118
According to Serbian nationalism’s efforts to address the world’s audience, it seems no
longer the notorious “Balkanist” and orientalist phenomenon endemic in the notorious European
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periphery. Instead, contemporary Serbian religious nationalism as well as the neighboring ethnic
nationalisms in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina follow the pattern of the new global religious
nationalism in a changing de-secularizing and globalizing world. The struggles over historic
monuments and holy places representing nothing less than the entire past and present of nations
and civilizations effectively influenced politics and government, mobilized masses, and drew
international attention. The crucial role of religion and manipulations with history create an
autonomous dimension of the conflict appearing as “eternal,” “ancient,” and not merely abut
land but about “identity,” “soul,” etc. This aspect of the conflict, regardless of whatever
pragmatic political solutions—even most radical such as partitions—in most cases precludes a
complete resolution. When conflicts involved disputes over historic sacred monuments and
consecration of land, resolution seems practically impossible. The controversy over “Serbian
Jerusalem” shares a number of similarities for example, with the Hindu-Muslim conflict over the
historic mosque/Hindu temple at Ajodhya in the 1990s, and the Jewish-Arab clashes since the
1960s over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.119 The most recent efforts by the inventors of the
“Serbian Jerusalem” idea aim at presenting the Kosovo conflict in the global context.
Accordingly, holy places such as Kosovo (in the Balkans) and Jerusalem (in Palestine) are major
battlefields in an ongoing global “clash of civilizations.” In order to prove the thesis, two
recently produced French and Serb documentary films highlight the Albanian attacks on the
Kosovo medieval churches and monasteries.120 Author of the Serbian documentary “Kosovo: A
Moment in Civilization” (Belgrade, 2017), Boris Malagurski, explains: “the script writer, a
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young Christian theologian from Belgrade, suggests to the viewers that the Kosovo theme is not
a local affair but concern for the entire Christian civilization … therefore the medieval
monasteries of Kosovo must be defended and the Albanian Kosovo Republic blocked from
becoming a member of UNESCO …”121
Overall, the Kosovo battle is itself a metaphor rather than an episode or a historical
moment denoting a process that changes forms and dynamics and is far from complete.
Nationalist elites seeking world’s attention have engineered its recent internationalization and
globalization drawing comparisons with internationally better-known issues they found
analogous. Religious nationalists today view globalization as an opportunity as well as
imperative to upgrade local and regional conflicts as global clashes and present them on the
world stage using increasingly the technological innovations of the global age. Religion is as
ever an ambivalent force in history and society. While religious activists engage in
humanitarianism, peacemaking, and conflict resolution, religious nationalists simultaneously
labor in the opposite direction. Although religion per se tends to de-secularize and consecrate
reality not to mention mythologizing history, in some cases it may aggravate and cement
conflicts. They often make resolvable conflicts “eternal.” As Mark Juergensmeyer argues,
religion often complicates, magnifies, and cements cultural, territorial, and political conflicts that
may be resolved without the religious meaning and influence. “When a struggle becomes
sacralized,” Juergensmeyer argues, “incidents that might previously have been considered minor
skirmishes or slight differences of understanding are elevated to monumental proportions…
Those who had been simple opponents become instead cosmic foes. The process of satanization
can transform a worldly struggle into a contest between martyrs and demons. Alas, this
121
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inescapable scenario of hostility does not end until the mythology is redirected or until one side
or the other has been destroyed …”122
To conclude, as noted in the introduction to this article, from the First World War and the
Paris Peace conference to the present, the idea of national self-determination has remained highly
attractive yet unarticulated and difficult to implement. The centennial of national selfdetermination unveils a history of conflicts over who, when, and how claims the right to national
self-determination and how to redefine state borders and territory in former imperial domains or
ethnically heterogeneous sates with separatist movements. The examined case of Serbian
nationalism in Kosovo paralleled by nationalist discourses to Israel-Palestine, exemplifies
presumably the most complex and troubled cases. The conflict arises from contesting territorial
claims between movements claiming territory in which it constitutes a majority of the
population, against movements seeking nationhood that fuses religion and nationality, while
justifying territorial claims by religious myths, invented traditions, and sacred historical
monuments. When a nationalist rivalry involves holy lands, religious identities, and religious
myths as key elements of national ideologies, such conflicts, to invoke Winston Churchill’s quip
about the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, will be resolved on Doomsday.

122

Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2003). Quoted from M. Juergensmeyer, “Cosmic War” in The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Religion, Global Perspectives on Religion, Religion and Politics, Oxford University Press USA, 2016.
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Belgrade: Politika AD.
Dedijer, V.1992. Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs During World War Two,
documents selected and compiled by Vladimir Dedijer, translated by Harvey L. Kendall, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books.
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